Short Bio

since 2016 – Assistant Professor of Business Economics
at WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management

2014 – Dissertation in Business Ethics
at University of Cologne (Supervisor: Bernd Irlenbusch)

2013 – Research Fellow Program on Negotiation
at Harvard University

2010 – Diploma in Economics
at University Bonn (Supervisor: Reinhard Selten)

2003 – Abitur Erzb. Irmgardis Gymnasium, Köln

1983 – Born in Plettenberg, Sauerland

Link to full CV (available soon)

Working paper

Below a list of recent research projects, I am working on together with my colleagues.

Fischer, M., Rilke, R.M., & Yurtoglu, B. (2020). Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity, and Team Performance. Submitted.

Reggiani T., & Rilke, R.M. (2020). When Too Good Is Too Much – Designing Social Incentive Contracts for Online Gig-workers. Submitted.

Rilke, R.M., Danilov, A., Irlenbusch, B., Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S. (2020). When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration. Submitted.

Guenther, C., Lehnen, S., & Rilke, R.M. (2019). Receiving Performance Feedback and Job Satisfaction: Evidence from a Field Experiment. Submitted.

Guenther, C., Litvinova, Y., & Rilke, R.M. (2020). Me, myself, and I: Image Concerns and Ethical Behavior in Immersive VR.

Guenther, C., Rilke, R.M., & Urbig, D. (2019). Why do entrepreneurs cooperate? A lab-in-the-field experiment.


Publications in Refereed Journals


Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., & Walkowitz, G. (2019). Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency. Experimental Economics, 22(2), 552–576. (link)


Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., & Walkowitz, G. (2018). Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis. International Journal of Game Theory, 47(1), 301–329. (link)


Rilke, R.M. (2017). On the duty to give and not to take. Journal of Business Economics, 87(9), 1129-1150. (link)


Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R.M., Sliwka, D. (2016). How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment. Experimental Economics. 19(3). 577-594. (link)

Rilke, R.M., Schurr A., Barkan R., Shalvi S. (2016). One-by-one or all-at-once? Self-reporting policies and dishonesty. Frontiers in Psychology. 7(113). (link)

Conrads, J., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R.M. (2016). Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: Evidence from a field experiment. Applied Economics Letters. 23(3), 206-211. (link)

Conrads, J., Ellenberger, M., Irlenbusch, B., Ohms, E.N., Rilke, R.M., Walkowitz, G. (2016). Team goal incentives and individual lying behavior. Die Betriebswirtschaft. 76(1). 103. (link)


Lönnqvist, J.E., Rilke, R.M., Walkowitz, G. (2015). On why hypocrisy thrives: Reasonable doubt created by moral posturing can deter punishment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 59. 139-145. (link)


Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., Schielke, A., Walkowitz, G. (2014). Honesty in tournaments. Economics Letters. 123(1). 90-93. (link)


Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., Walkowitz, G. (2013). Lying and team incentives. Journal of Economic Psychology. 34. 1-7. (link)

Press coverage

Harvard Business Manager (3/2019)

I spoke to the Harvard Business Manager about the implications of one of my recent publication on role models and motivation. (Link to the article)

Rhein-Zeitung (12/2017)

The local press covered the student projects of my course “Field Experiments in Organizations”. The students helped small enterprises with field experiments to improve their operations. The article features the experiments of two groups trying to understand tipping behavior in a local barber shop and a restaurant; but also the other groups put in enormous efforts to run very exciting field experiments.

Random pictures