Business ethics and economics // Research and teaching
since 2016 – Assistant Professor of Business Economics
at WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management
2014 – Dissertation in Business Ethics
at University of Cologne (Supervisor: Bernd Irlenbusch)
2013 – Research Fellow Program on Negotiation
at Harvard University
2010 – Diploma in Economics
at University Bonn (Supervisor: Reinhard Selten)
2003 – Abitur Erzb. Irmgardis Gymnasium, Köln
1983 – Born in Plettenberg, Sauerland
Link to full CV (available soon)
Below a list of recent research projects that I am working on together with my colleagues.
Rilke, R.M., Danilov, A., Irlenbusch, B., Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S. (2019). When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration.
Guenther, C., Lehnen, S., & Rilke, R.M. (2019). The double-edged sword of performance feedback: A field experiment investigating structure as a boundary condition for increased job satisfaction.
Guenther, C., Litvinova, Y., & Rilke, R.M. (2019). Virtually no influence of image concerns on ethical behavior.
Reggiani T., & Rilke, R.M. (2019). Selection effects of social incentives – A natural field experiment.
Guenther, C., Rilke, R.M., & Urbig, D. (2019). Why do entrepreneurs cooperate? A lab-in-the-field experiment.
Fischer, M., Rilke, R.M., & Yurtoglu, B. (2019). How does self-selection affect team performance? Evidence from a field experiment.
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2019
Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., & Walkowitz, G. (2019). Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency. Experimental Economics, 22(2), 552–576. (link)
2018
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., & Walkowitz, G. (2018). Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis. International Journal of Game Theory, 47(1), 301–329. (link)
2017
Rilke, R.M. (2017). On the duty to give and not to take. Journal of Business Economics, 87(9), 1129-1150. (link)
2016
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R.M., Sliwka, D. (2016). How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment. Experimental Economics. 19(3). 577-594. (link)
Rilke, R.M., Schurr A., Barkan R., Shalvi S. (2016). One-by-one or all-at-once? Self-reporting policies and dishonesty. Frontiers in Psychology. 7(113). (link)
Conrads, J., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R.M. (2016). Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: Evidence from a field experiment. Applied Economics Letters. 23(3), 206-211. (link)
Conrads, J., Ellenberger, M., Irlenbusch, B., Ohms, E.N., Rilke, R.M., Walkowitz, G. (2016). Team goal incentives and individual lying behavior. Die Betriebswirtschaft. 76(1). 103. (link)
2015
Lönnqvist, J.E., Rilke, R.M., Walkowitz, G. (2015). On why hypocrisy thrives: Reasonable doubt created by moral posturing can deter punishment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 59. 139-145. (link)
2014
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., Schielke, A., Walkowitz, G. (2014). Honesty in tournaments. Economics Letters. 123(1). 90-93. (link)
2013
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., Walkowitz, G. (2013). Lying and team incentives. Journal of Economic Psychology. 34. 1-7. (link)
Harvard Business Manager (3/2019)
Rhein-Zeitung (12/2017)
